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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES
WILLIAM D. WARREN*
The similarity of the subject matter, together with the paucity of
cases in each field, has made it advisable to combine the personal
property and sales cases in one article. Though the total number of
cases falling within these fields was small, the proportion of novel and
interesting issues raised was high. This article is an attempt to analyze
as well as describe the significant cases decided in this area within the
past year.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Possession: No one who has ever examined the maze of cases listed
in the Decennial Digests on the topic of illegal possession of intoxicat-
ing liquor will seriously dispute the statement that" 'Possession' is one
of the vaguest of all vague terms."' One of the more bedeviling prob-
lems in this area arises when one is charged with illegally possessing
liquor where the liquor is found on the defendant's premises, but
where, as in Hicks v. State,2 the defendant maintains that he did not
know that it was there and offers evidence to prove that he had been
absent from the house for a week. The Hicks case was further com-
plicated by a statement on the defendant's part that during his ab-
sence another man had occupied the house with his wife. In affirming
a conviction of the defendant, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied
a presumption that everything in a house is in the possession of the
"man of the house" and held that the defendant's evidence did not
rebut the presumption.
It is difficult to determine the exact ground for the Court's holding.
It may be that the Court did not believe that the presumption of pos-
session was rebutted because it did not find that the defendant put in
enough evidence to prove his alleged week's absence. If, on the other
hand, the Court would have been willing to uphold the presumption
of possession even though there had actually been an absence, a very
interesting problem of the interrelationship of the concept of possession
and the law of crimes is presented.
The statute under which this prosecution was brought makes it a
crime "to possess intoxicating liquors ... whether intended for per-
sonal use or otherwise."'3 This section very largely removes criminal
intent as an element of the crime and punishes the criminal act. The
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Quoted from Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 AMINN. L. REv. 611 (1932).
2. 250 S.W.2d 559 (Tern. 1952).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11216 (Williams 1934).
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prohibition is directed to the act of possession; no evil intent need ac-
company this possession at all. It has long been settled that legislatures
can remove criminal intent as an element in crimes where the statute
is in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare.4 The statute
in question is a typical example of a "public welfare crime."
But is the criminal act of possession sufficiently shown where liquor
is found on the premises of one who has been absent from his premises,
which have in the interim been occupied by other adults? Surely there
is not enough physical control by the accused over the liquor to hold
that there is "actual possession" in such a case.5 If there is to be
possession at all here, it must, then, be a species of "constructive
possession"; but is there even constructive possession here?
The concept of constructive possession has served a useful purpose
in the law of Personal Property. In certain situations to reach a desir-
able result a finding of possession is necessary; if some of the elements
of actual possession are missing, the doctrine of constructive posses-
sion may be called into play. A typical example is the situation where
a person finds a valuable article hidden on the land of another. In
order to find a violation of the landowner's rights the court may have to
find that he has possession of the article. If so, constructive possession
supplies the solution.6
Now, admitting that it is necessary to use constructive possession to
reach desirable results in some cases, it seems harsh enough to employ
the somewhat tenuous concept of constructive possession to supply the
necessary act in a criminal prosecution where the act alone is being
punished,7 without extending the limits of constructive possession to
4. "At common law the fundamental concept of crime included criminal in-
tent, and until the advent of public welfare offenses the courts, in the absence
of legislative instructions to the contrary, interpreted statutory crimes as re-
quiring mens rea in conformity with the common law. In the cases involving
public welfare offenses, however, a new rule of construction was developed,
the courts holding that the omission by the legislature of the necessity of intent
dispensed with it and that there could be a conviction without a showing that
the accused had any unlawful intent." 5 VAND. L. REv. 828 (1952). See, gen-
erally, Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REV. 55 (1933).
5. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 18-21 (1936).
6. South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 44, is such
a case. A typical statement is: "The possession of land carries with it in gen-
eral, by our law, possession of everything which is attached to or under the
land, and, in the absence of better title elsewhere, the right to possess it also.
And it makes no difference that the possessor is not aware of the things
existence.... But it seems preferable to say that the legal possession rests on a
real de facto possession constituted by the occupier's general power and intent
to exclude unauthorized interference." (emphasis added) POLLOCK AND
WRiGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 41 (1888). The phrase
"legal possession" is synonymous with constructive possession.
7. "Constructive possession of prohibted liquor, alone, is not sufficient to
justify a conviction. There must be a guilty scienter shown by the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt." Wilbanks v. State, 28 Ala. App. 456, 185 So. 770,
771 (1939).
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encompass a situation where there is as slight a relationship between
the object and the accused as that suggested by the Hicks casey •
Gifts: Rose v. Parker9 presented, as do most cases concerning gifts
which reach the appellate courts, a somewhat complicated fact situa-
tion. In 1924 F had his bank issue a certificate of stock of that bank
to his daughter, D, in whose name the certificate was entered on the
records of the bank. Nevertheless, F retained possession of the certifi-
cate, received the dividends and voted the shares by proxy. In 1928 D
indorsed the certificate, and it was pledged by F to his son, S, shortly
after D's death in 1930. In 1934 F died, and the present action was com-
menced some years later by D's administrator to replevy the stock
certificate from the trustees of F's estate. The Court of Appeals re-
versed the chancellor's decree and held that the stock belonged to F's
estate.
Was there an inter vivos gift to D of the certificate? The factors
favoring an inter vivos gift to D were: (1) the stock certificate was
entered in D's name on the corporate records, and (2) the dividends
from the stock in question were paid to D's sons on several occasions
after F's death. The factors against an inter vivos gift were: (1) F
apparently never relinquished possession of the certificate, (2) F
treated the stock as his own in that he received the dividends and voted
the stock and (3) F had no donative intent, as the transfer was merely
a fictional one to have the stock assessed in D's name for tax purposes.
The Court's holding that there was no inter vivos gift is well sup-
ported by the authorities. The essentials of an inter vivos gift are (1)
an intent by the donee to give and (2) a delivery of the subject matter
of the gift by the donor to the donee.10 Neither element seems to be
present here. F's oral statement to his sons to the effect that the trans-
8. Judge Gailor dissented, 250 S.W.2d at 561, on the grounds that the.pre-
sumption of possession was not applicable. He pointed out that the case which
laid down the presumption of possession by the "man of the house" ih Ten-
nessee, Crocker v. State, 148 Tenn. 106, 251 S.W. 914 (1923), is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the Hicks case. In the Crocker case, both the husband and
wife were actually present on the premises. The wife was convicted of possess-
ing the liquor, but the Court reversed on the ground that, where there is no
evidence to show that the wife rather than the husband possessed the whiskey,
the Court will presume that the liquor was in the possession, of the head of
the family. In Williamson v. State, 191 Miss. 643, 4 So.2d 220 (1941);'the facts
were very similar to the Hicks case, except that there the defendant had been
absent for three weeks and there was no intervention by a third party. The
Mississippi court applied the presumption that the husband was in possession
of the liquor due to his status as head of the house and affirmed a conviction.
As in the Hicks case, the Williamson decision met with a vigorous dissent. In
Dean v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 253, 110 P.2d 921 (1941), the defendant was con-
victed of possessing liquor which was found in her home even though* she had
been absent for sometime before it was found; the court made much of the 'fact
that there were no adults at the house who would be likely to bring liquor
into the house.
9. 251 S.W.2d 320 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
10. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 76 (1936).
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fer was only for tax purposes, together with his acts regarding the
certificate, indicated that he had no intent to relinquish control of the
certificate. Nor under the Tennessee decisions does there seem to have
been a delivery here. Though recognizing that the law is different in
some states," the Supreme Court in the 1944 case of Figuers v. Sher-
ref1l 2 held that there was no completed gift where a stockholder turned
in a certificate of stock and had the corporation. issue and record a new
certificate in the name of the alleged donee, but had the new cer-
tificate delivered into his own hands and retained possession of it until
his death, nothing else being done to show a gift by him.
13
Even had there been a valid inter vivos gift, the subsequent indorse-
ment by D would seem to have transferred title to F. The indorsement
manifested an intent to transfer, and the delivery was accomplished by
reason of F's already having possession of the certificate.
Bail-nients: Two basic principles of the law of bailments were re-
iterated in cases decided during the Survey period. Dickson v.
Blacker'4 raised the problem of the duty of care required of a bailee.
In that case, the bailor left his automobile with a parking lot operator,
whose employee took the car out and wrecked it. The Court in holding
the bailee liable for his employee's negligence repeated the familiar
rule that, where the bailment is for the mutual benefit of the parties,
the bailee is bound to exercise ordinary care.15 Therefore, as he is not
an insurer of the property, if the automobile were damaged by a third
party over which the bailee had no control, no liability would accrue
11. The Court in Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629, 152 A.L.R.
420 (1944), cited the following cases as sustaining the view that there may be a
completed gift where a stock certificate is issued in the name of another but
the holder of the old certificate retains possession of it: Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N.E. 319 (1928) ; Reed v. Roberts, 85 Pa. 84 (1877);
Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267, 179 Atl. 157, 99 A.L.R. 1074 (1935). "Gen-
erally, there is a complete gift of corporate stock where . . . a certificate is
issued in the first instance in the name of the donee, although the certificate so
issued is retained by the donor or the corporation, and not delivered to the
donee." Moore v. Van Tassell, 58 Wyo. 121, 126 P.2d 9, 12 (1942), citing 24
AAM. JUR., Gifts 771-72 (1939). For a list of recent cases to this effect, see
Note, 152 A.L.R. 427 (1944).
12. 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944).
13. Cf. Coffey v. Comm'r, 141 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1944); Biehl v. Biehl, 263
Ky. 710, 93 S.W.2d 836 (1936). But cf. Chandler v. Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43
S.W.2d 397 (1931), where the Court found a completed gift even though the
donor retained possession of the certificate.
14. 253 S.W.2d 728 (Tenn. 1952). The agency problem in this case is taken
up in the Master and Servant section of the Agency article in this Survey.
15. This rule has found support in a number of Tennessee decisions, among
them are: Dodge v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 142 Tenn. 20, 215 S.W. 274, 7
A.L.R. 1229 (1919); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128
Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480 (1913); Kelton v. Taylor, 79 Tenn. 264 (1883); Old
Hickory Parking Corp. v. Alloway, 26 Tenn. App. 683, 177 S.W.2d 23 (M.S.
1944) (a parking lot case).
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to the bailee.16 Some of the older Tennessee cases'7 and an occasional
modern one18 have phrased the test of standard of care in mutual bene-
fit bailment situations somewhat differently. A 1947 Court of Appeals
decision said: "The care required of bailees in a case of this kind is
that which men of ordinary prudence exercise under similar circum-
stances with respect to their own property or the property of others
placed in their custody."' 9 Does the reference, to the care men give
their own property increase the standard of care to one greater than
ordinary care? It is improbable that the Tennessee courts have in-
tended it to do so. Doubtless this variation on the rule is more referable
to an attempt on the part of the Court to explain what ordinary care
means than to an effort to dispose of it as the legal standard.20
The liability of a bailor to a third party injured by the negligence
of the bailee was before the Court in English v. Stevens.21 There the
owner of a truck tractor loaned this bulky vehicle, without the trailer,
to his brother to drive to a family reunion. The plaintiff was injured
in a collision caused by the bailee's negligence. A substantial verdict
against the bailor was reversed in the Court of Appeals on the well-
established ground that the negligence of the bailee is not imputed to
the bailor. 2 If the bailor is to be held, his liability must rest on his
own negligence. Thus if the bailor had entrusted a vehicle to a driver
known to be incompetent23 or if the vehicle itself was so defective as
to be likely to injure third parties and the bailor knew of this or should
have know of it,24 his liability would have been established. Since the
driver was an experienced truck operator and since the tractor was not
dangerously unsuited to being operated without a trailer, no negligence
on the bailor's part was present.
Liens: A conflict of laws problem 'occupied the Court in Nelson-
Collins-Nash, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp.2 There Daniels pur-
16. But cf. Hilton v. Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173 (E.S. 1928). The Court in
the Dickson case indicated that the Hilton decision should be strictly limited to
the facts involved.
17. Yeatman v. Hart, 25 Tenn. 375 (1845); Angus v. Dickerson, 19 Tenn. 459
(1838).
18. Fields v. Gordon, 30 Tenn. App. 110, 203 S.W.2d 934 (W.S. 1947).
19. Id. at 117, 203 S.W.2d at 938.
20. Both of the two most used legal encyclopedias define ordinary care as
that care which an ordinary prudent man would exercise in caring for his
own property. 6 AM. Jum., Bailments § 249 (Rev. ed. 1950); 8 C.J.S., Bailments
§ 27 (1938).
21. 249 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952). See the discussion of this case
in subsection (1) of part I, section A of the Torts article.
22. "Neither negligence nor, in this jurisdiction, contributory negligence of
the bailee or his servants is imputable to the bailor." Siegrist Bakery Co. v.
Smith, 162 Tenn. 253, 259, 36 S.W.2d 80, 81 (1931). See also cases cited in notes
23 and 24 infra. See East Tennessee & Western North Carolina Motor Transp.
Co. v. Brooks, 173 Tenn. 542, 548, 121 S.W.2d 559, 561 (1938). 1
23. V. L. Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, 177 Tenn. 440, 150 S.W.2d 1069 (1941)
(truck entrusted to driver with a known affinity to liquor).
24. Vaughn v. Millington, 160 Tenn. 197, 22 S.W.2d 226 (1929).
25. 249 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 1952).
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chased under a conditional sale contract an automobile from the plain-
tiff company's assignor in Georgia, where the contract was recorded
as required by Georgia law. Daniels then took the auto into Tennessee
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff and incurred a sub-
stantial bill with the defendant company for repairs on the automobile.
When the defendant retained the property in assertion of its common
law artisan's lien, the plaintiff sued in replevin and recovered. This
was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the prior re-
corded Georgia conditional sale prevailed over the subsequently ac-
quired Tennessee artisan's lien.
This case represents but another step in an orderly progression of
Tennessee decisions which over the last 40 years have uniformly given
wide recognition to recorded foreign chattel security contracts. Foreign
chattel mortgages have been held to prevail over Tennessee innocent
purchasers, 26 subsequent mortgagees 27 and attaching creditors 28 where
the foreign mortgagee gave no consent to the removal of the property
to this State. These decisions were predicated upon the "rule of comity
between the states" which the Court also referred to as the "rule of
interstate courtesy."
29
Should the same rule apply where a foreign chattel mortgagee is
contending for priority over a Tennessee holder of a common law
artisan's lien as applies where the local claimant is a bona fide pur-
chaser or creditor? These last-mentioned parties have lost money or
valuable claims if their claim is not preferred, but the mechanic does
more than this, for his labors preserve or improve the security itself.
Could it not be said that by allowing the chattel mortgagor to have
possession the mortgagee has impliedly consented to having those re-
pairs made which are necessary to maintain and preserve his security?
Although the common law lienor appears to have a stronger case than
the other parties mentioned, the Tennessee Court in the 1950 case of
Taylor v. Liddon-White Truck Co. 30 rejected the "increased value"
theory for differentiating between lienors and the other parties and
held that the foreign mortgagee also prevailed over a Tennessee arti-
san's lien.31
Thus by 1950 the Tennessee authorities had established that a prior
26. Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S.W. 490 (1911).
27. Hamblen Motor Co. v. Miller & Harle, 150 Tenn. 602, 266 S.W. 99 (1924).
28. Bankers' Finance Corp. v. Locke & Massey Motor Co., 170 Tenn. 28, 91
S.W.2d 297 (1936). This case apparently overrules Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn.
309, 79 S.W. 796 (1903).
29. "It seems a churlish and ungracious course, if not an example of im-
provident judgment, to hold out against the generous comity of the many States
which recognize the rule of interstate courtesy upon this subject." Newsum
v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 374-75, 137 S.W. 490, 492 (1911).
30. 191 Tenn. 336, 233 S.W.2d 52 (1950).
31. In reaching a result contrary to the Taylor case, Willys Overland Co. v.
Evans, 104 Kan. 632, 180 Pac. 235 (1919), attaches some weight to the increased
value theory.
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recorded foreign chattel mortgage was to be preferred over local sub-
sequent mortgagees, bona fide purchasers, creditors and even common
law lien holders, at least where the chattel was taken into Tennessee
without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. This left as the
only extension necessary to attain the result reached by the Court in
the Nelson-Collins-Nash case the application of this body of doctrine
to foreign recorded conditional sales. Since no reason of policy or
precedent would seem to require a distinction between chattel mort-
gages and conditional sales - in this respect, at least - the Court with
a minimum of discussion willingly made the extension. Although
wherever one of two innocent parties must suffer the result can never
be an entirely satisfactory one, still, in furthering the security of credit
transactions by protecting the holder of a recorded security interest,
this trend of decisions in Tennessee would seem to represent the better
social policy.32
Fixtures: A question not heretofore resolved in this jurisdiction
arose in Julian Engineering Co. v. R. J. & C. W. Fletcher, Inc. 33 In this
case, a pre-fabricated smokehouse had been sold to the defendant on
conditional sale. The defendant went into default, and the conditional
vendor sued in detinue to retake possession. One of the defendant's
principal contentions on appeal was that the smokehouse had lost its
character as personal property and, therefore, its liability to be re-
possessed as such. The Supreme Cburt, after finding no Tennessee
authority directly in point, briefly disposed of the defendant's argument
in holding that the smokehouse was removable and that the plaintiff
could retake possession.
It seems clear that, as between the original parties, the conditional
vendor's right to remove a chattel affixed to the realty will be given
effect where the conditional vendor and vendee expressly agree to a
right of removal in case of default.34 But nothing was said in the
Julian case about an express right of removal, and the Court ap-
parently treated it as a case where there was none. To cover this
situation, the Court adopted the rule that, where articles are sold un-
der a conditional sale, an agreement reserving the right to removal is
implied. Although not enough facts are given to evaluate the case
fully - such as a more complete description of the nature of the smoke-
house in question -this holding seems in accord with the view pre-
vailing in other jurisdictions.35
32. For text discussions generally commending this view see, GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 156-58 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 393-99
(2d ed. 1951). Contra: Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 163 Atl.
810 (1933), 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 767 (1933).
33. 253 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. 1953).
34. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 47-48 (Casner ed. 1952).
35. Commereial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 98 Fla. 410, 123 So. 814
(1929); Schellenberg v. Detroit Heating & Lighting Co., 130 Mich. 439, 90 N.W.
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SALES
Sales by Sample: In Grainer v. Nashville Corrugated Box Co.,36 the
buyer needed 2500 cartons suitable for shipping a like number of
advertising displays. After some negotiations with the seller, the
buyer received from the seller a sample carton which the buyer in-
spected and approved before giving his order for the entire lot of boxes.
Although the cartons conformed to the sample, they proved unfit for
carrying the displays. The seller sued the buyer for the unpaid balance
due on the boxes, and the buyer sued the seller for breach of contract.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's action in giving judg-
ment for the seller and dismissing the buyer's action.
Normally we think of the seller's obligations to the buyer in a sale by
sample as being satisfied whenever the seller delivers to the buyer
goods conforming to that sample.37 One exception to this rule arises
where the seller is a dealer in the goods concerned and the goods are
unmerchantable because of a defect which was not apparent to the
buyer in his inspection of the sample. In such a case, the seller may
be liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability even when
the goods did conform to the sample.m
The interesting question which is suggested by the Grainer case is
whether there should not be another exception to this rule based on
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Section 7208
says: "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment...
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such pur-
pose. ' 39 Now suppose a buyer tells a seller that he needs a number
of a certain type of boxes for a certain purpose and the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment in selecting goods to fit this specified
need. The seller then makes up a sample and shows it to the buyer,
who inspects the box and approves it. Later, when the order has been
delivered and is in use, the buyer finds that, although the boxes are
exactly like the sample, have no patent defects and may be perfectly
fit for carrying some kinds of merchandise, still because of a latent
defect they fail to hold up in carrying the merchandise for which they
were chosen or made. Should the seller be held for breach of the im-
47 (1902); New York Invest. & Improv. Co. v. Cosgrove, 47 App. Div. 35, 62
N.Y. Supp. 372 (1st Dep't 1900), af'd, 167 N.Y. 601, 60 N.E. 1117 (1901). See
also 22 Am. JuR., Fixtures § 20 (1938); 36 C.J.S., Fixtures § 14 (1943).
36. 255 S.2d 701 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
37. "As a general rule all the buyer is entitled to, in case of a sale or contract
to sell by sample, is that the goods shall be like the sample." 1 WILLISTON,
SALES 678-79 (Rev. ed. 1948). For a Tennessee case on implied warranties in
sales by sample, see Elbinger Shoe Co. v. Thomas, 1 Tenn. App. 161 (M.S. 1925).
38. This is the situation covered by TENN. CODE ANN. § 7209(c) (Williams
1934).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7208(1) (Williams 1934).
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plied warranty that the boxes be suitable for the particular purpose
for which they were intended?
If there had been no sample involved in this hypothetical case, it
seems clear that the seller would be liable under section 7208. Why
should the addition of a sample change the seller's liability if the buyer
would be unable to tell whether the sample was defective or not?
Williston contends that in the hypothetical case stated there should be
liability on the seller's part for a breach of warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose even though the goods conformed to the sample.40
It is impossible to tell whether the facts of the Grainer case are iden-
tical to the hypothetical stated above. The opinion does seem to treat
the case as turning on an implied warranty of fitness,41 but it is difficult
to tell exactly why the Court found no breach of this warranty. If
the case is like the hypothetical, the decision reached by the Court of
Appeals is open to criticism. On the other hand, the Court may have
believed that there was no reliance on the seller's skill or judgment in
selecting the boxes or that whatever defects were present were patent
and should have been discovered by the buyer. If this was the case,
the holding was a sound one.
Implied Warranties of Fitness and Merchantability: An interesting
example of the interrelationship of the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose and the implied warranty of merchantability 43
is found in Kohn v. Ball,44 where the plaintiff purchased from the de-
fendant an automobile which proved to be defective by reason of the
fact that water leaked into the car and damaged the interior. The
plaintiff's recovery against the dealer on the basis of breach of an
implied warranty of quality was sustained by the Court of Appeals.
The defendant's principal contention seems to have been that there
are no implied warranties of quality when an article is sold under its
patent or trade name. The Court agreed that this is true with regard
to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Subsec-
40. "Also, though ordinarily in a contract or sale by sample there can be no
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, yet if the buyer relies on the
seller's skill and judgment and the seller furnishes a sample the unfitness of
which is not apparent on inspection there should be such a warranty." 1 WIL-
LISTON, SALES 680 (Rev. ed. 1948).
41. The Court quoted from two cases which were concerned with implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. Goad v. Johnson, 53 Tenn. 340
(1871), and LeSueur v. Franklin Limestone Co., 14 Tenn. App. 67 (M.S. 1931).
Neither case is directly in point, and the Goad case is of doubtful validity after
the passage of TENN. CODE ANN. § 7208 (Williams 1934).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7208(1) (Williams 1934). For the wording of this
subsection see the quoted portion in the section on Sales by Sample, supra.
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7208(2) (Williams 1934) provides: "Where the goods
are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description
• . . there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality."
44. 254 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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tion (4) of section 7208 is direct authority on this question.4 5 But the
Court went ahead to hold that there was an implied warranty of
merchantability present in this case which was not excluded by the fact
that the purchaser ordered the article by a trade name. This holding
seems proper and desirable. It may be true that, when one requests
an article by its trade name, this is some indication that the purchaser
does not rely on the skill or judgment of the seller in choosing the
goods; hence, the warranty of fitness under subsection (1) should
normally not apply. However, the warranty of merchantability under
subsection (2) does not rest on the buyer's reliance on the skill or
judgment of the seller in selecting the goods to be purchased; conse-
quently, whether the purchaser ordered by a trade name should be
irrelevant. 46 This appears to be the first Tennessee case considering the
point directly.
Although not necessary to the decision, another point raised by the
Court merits some attention. The Court stated that besides the reason
mentioned above there was another ground for holding that there
was no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose involved in pur-
chasing the automobile. This was because the only purpose known to
the seller for which the car was to be used was for "business and
pleasure." This was held too general a use to fall within the "par-
ticular purpose" clause of subsection (1). The Tennessee Court would,
therefore, seem to require the purpose for which an article is bought
to be a narrow or specific one for the warranty of fitness to apply.
There is support for the Tennessee view, 47 but Williston 48 and a num-
ber of cases4 9 allow the particular purpose of subsection (1) to be very
broad and general.
Estoppel: The somewhat complicated facts in Gill for Use and Bene-
fit of Rawdon v. Paschal5° were that Gill, the plaintiff, purchased an
auto from Evans Chevrolet Company in Ohio and took title in the name
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7208 (4) (Williams 1934) states: "In the case of a con-
tract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade
name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
46. "If the buyer requests exactly described goods ... it does not preclude
an obligation on the part of the seller to furnish merchantable goods of that
description .... " 1 WILLISTON, SALES 610 (Rev. ed. 1948).
47. A square holding supporting the Tennessee view is State ex 'rel. Jones
Stores Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944), where the court held
that there is no implied warranty that a blouse is fit for ordinary wear.
48. In 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 235 (Rev. ed. 1948), the author expresses the
view that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be the equivalent
of merchantability. That is, the "particular purpose" may be so broad as to in-
clude the obvious, general purpose for which the article is intended.
49. American Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., 108 Kan. 690, 196 Pac. 1111 (1921)
(extensive quote on the subject in question, 196 Pac. at 1112); Crawford v.
Abbott Auto. Co., 117 La. 59, 101 So. 871 (1924); Harvey v. Buick Motor Co.,
177 S.W. 774 (Mo. App. 1915); Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4
A.2d 73 (1939).
50. 248 S.W.2d 325 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
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of Rawdon. Then Gill sold the car at a dealers' auction in Louisville to
Devers, who paid with a bad check. Gill turned over to Devers the
invoice showing that Rawdon had purchased from Evans Chevrolet.
Devers apparently also received a bill of sale from the auction com-
pany. The car then was sold to Padgett and passed on to the defendant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling of a directed
verdict for the defendant in the plaintiff's conversion action.
It is settled in Tennessee that, where a seller in a cash sale delivers
possession of goods, unaccompanied by any documentary indicia of
title, to a buyer, no title passes to the buyer when he gives payment in
a worthless check.51 Consequently, the seller can assert his title against
an innocent purchaser from the buyer. The rationale is that the pass-
age* of title depends on the intention of the parties and that the seller
would usually not intend title to pass until the check clears. 52 Where,
however, the seller entrusts the purchaser who gives a bad check with
possession plus indicia of title, the Tennessee cases evidently abandon
any inquiry into the intent of the parties and hold for the innocent
purchaser on the grounds of estoppel.53 In a 1950 decision reaching
this result,54 the seller deliberately withheld the bill of sale until the
check should clear, thus indicating that he did not intend to pass title
until clearance. But the seller did give the buyer possession of a car-
bon copy of an order blank which showed little more than what the
price of the car was supposed to be. The Court held this order blank
to be "a clear indicia of ownership.
'55
In the Gill case, no mention was made of the importance of the bill
of sale, but the Court seemed to rely on the invoice showing that
Rawdon had purchased from Evans Chevrolet as indicium of title in
holding the seller to be estopped from recovering. This decision and
the 1950 case noted above seem to lay down an extremely lax rule with
regard to what are sufficient indicia of title to estop a seller receiving
a bad check as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser.5 6
51. John S. Hale & Co., Inc. v. Beley Cotton Co. & Union & Planters Bank &
Trust Co., 154 Tenn. 689, 290 S.W. 994 (1927); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co.,
152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924). 2 WrLLISTON, SALES § 346a (Rev. ed. 1948)
contains a thorough discussion of this rule. The author describes it as the ma-
jority rule but criticizes it vigorously.
52. 2 WILLSTON, SALES § 346a (Rev. ed. 1948).
53. Jackson v. Waller, 190 Tenn. 588, 230 S.W.2d 1013 (1950); Pool v. George,
30 Tenn. App. 608, 209 S.W. 55 (E.S. 1947). In the Pool case, a bill of sale was
the indicium of title. The Jackson case said: "It is not a question as to the
intention of the [seller] but what he did to clothe another with apparent title
so that an innocent person might be entrapped." 190 Tenn. at 591, 230 S.W.2d
at 1014.
54. Jackson v. Waller, supra note 53.
55. 190 Tenn. at 591, 230 S.W.2d at 1014.
56. The Tennessee Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law of 1951, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5538.101 et seq. (Williams Supp. 1952), should affect this result
with regard to those vehicles coming under the Act. Id. § 5538.148.
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Statute of Frauds: Section 719757 provides that no contract for the
sale of goods of over $500 is enforceable unless one of three things is
present: (1) acceptance and receipt of the goods on the part of the
buyer, (2) something given in earnest to bind the bargain or in part
payment or (3) a memorandum of the contract signed by the party to
be charged therewith. One of the issues of Buice v. Scruggs Equipment
Co.58 was whether the equitable doctrine of part performance applies
to a sale of goods to supply yet a fourth method of taking a case out
of the statute of frauds. In the Buice case, the defendant orally prom-
ised that, in exchange for the plaintiff's remaining with a corporation
and performing certain services, the defendant would sell the plaintiff
300 shares of stock at substantially less than the market value. The de-
fendant refused to perform, and, upon being sued for breach of con-
tract, raised the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's ruling which had sustained the defendant's demurrer.
Although the doctrine of part performance has long been rejected in
Tennessee with regard to land contracts, 9 this is the second Tennessee
case applying it to contracts for the sale of goods.60 Neither decision
gives any cogent reason for placing this unusually liberal interpreta-
tion on the doctrine of part performance with regard to chattels in a
jurisdiction which has denied any validity to the doctrine in its almost
universally accepted setting of land contracts. Neither of the recog-
nized authorities on contracts recognizes part performance as an in-
dependent ground for avoiding the statute in sale of goods cases.6 1 Both
would require that the performance be a part of the price bargained
for, thus falling under the statutory exception of part payment. The
result in the Buice case would be the same whether the doctrine
of part performance or the part payment clause is relied on. Clearly
the price for the stock was the plaintiff's services.
It is generally said that the doctrine of part performance is a purely
equitable creature, unrecognized at law; consequently, it is not avail-
able to sustain an action at law based on a contract within the statute
of frauds.62 Yet the first Tennessee case applying the doctrine to a
contract action commenced in the circuit court.63 The Buice case, al-
though brought in chancery, was again for breach of contract, an ac-
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7197 (Williams 1934).
58. 250 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1952). For a discussion of the other issues of the
case, see the Ultra Vires Contracts section of the Business Associations article
in this Survey and 22 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1953).
59. Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906); Crippen v.
Bearden, 24 Tenn. 129 (1844); Patton v. McClure, 8 Tenn. 333 (1828).
60. The first was Ashley and Gibbs v. Aven Preston, 162 Tenn. 540, 39 S.W.2d
279 (1931).
61. 2 CoRBn, CoNTRAcTs 670-71 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 125 (Rev. ed.
1948).
62. See the many cases supporting this proposition cited in Note, 59 A.L.R.
1305 (1929).
63. Ashley and Gibbs v. Aven Preston, 162 Tenn. 540, 39 S.W.2d 279 (1931).
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tion which is historically legal by jurisdiction over which chancery has
been given statutory concurrent jurisdiction.64 This factor, together
with Tennessee's traditional animosity to part performance, might well
commend the view of the authorities mentioned above -that these
cases should be decided on the basis of one of the statutory exceptions,
either part payment or acceptance and receipt.
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10377 (Williams 1934). McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N.J.
Eq. 828 (1880), was a suit brought in chancery to enforce what the court con-
sidered in substance an action to enforce a legal demand. The court held that
the doctrine of part performance could not be used for the reason that it would
not validate a contract at law. "The dictum that part performance will make
valid a contract invalid by the statute of frauds, is exclusively the creature of
equity, and applies only to contracts relating to lands, and does not extend to
contracts relating to other matters." Id. at 832-33.
